The common pattern across all of these seems to be filesystem and network ACLs enforced by the OS, not a separate kernel or hardware boundary. A determined attacker who already has code execution on your machine could potentially bypass Seatbelt or Landlock restrictions through privilege escalation. But that is not the threat model. The threat is an AI agent that is mostly helpful but occasionally careless or confused, and you want guardrails that catch the common failure modes - reading credentials it should not see, making network calls it should not make, writing to paths outside the project.
美国作家莫娜 · 辛普森：做最好的自己
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Agent 会自动调用 mco 命令，通过它指挥其他 Agent 并行执行任务。不需要去背 MCO 的参数，Agent 读一下 mco -h 自己就知道怎么用了。
A source told the BBC the tone of the discussion between Hegseth and Amodei was cordial, but Amodei laid out what Anthropic considers to be its red lines.